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Reimagining Justice as Preservative Care
for Sustained Peace: Learning from Ethics
of Care and Indigenous Philosophies
Robert Michael Ruehl

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls offers a unique conception of justice as other philosophers have before him, such as Plato, Thomas
Hobbes, and David Hume (Pomerleau n.d.). From a different angle,
ethics of care philosophers have addressed justice too (Bubeck 1995;
Engster 2007; Held 2006; Tronto 2013). For Western ethical and
political thought in general, justice has been important, and existing
political orders have made justice a signiﬁcant, genuine virtue. In the
United States, the Preamble of the Constitution includes establishing
justice as one of its goals; respect for justice molds American youth
as they pledge allegiance to the ﬂag, a recitation ending with the
phrase “with liberty and justice for all” (Okin 1989, 3). Furthermore,
James Madison believed that “justice is the end of government”, and
the principles of justice help the majority to unite despite many parties and various interests (2003, 254-255). Arguably, Western society
has failed to realize justice, whether this relates to race and police
brutality, economic inequality and exploitation, oppression of women
or people with different gender identities, or colonization and genocidal practices against Indigenous nations and peoples; some may
claim Western societies have done more to promote injustice. In this
essay, I will reimagine justice and offer an alternative interpretation:
justice as preservative care for sustained peace.
First, the traditionally accepted interpretation of justice will be
explained, which focuses on humans getting what they deserve.
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Second, Book I of Plato’s Republic and Cicero’s On Duties provide
reasons for rethinking the concept of justice as a necessary component for being an excellent, thriving person. Plato and Cicero create
space for partiality and care when considering justice, so the relevance of ethic-of-care approaches for reimagining justice becomes
obvious. An ethic of care foregrounds partiality and urges people to
remember how necessary care is in daily relationships, institutions,
and societies, but it also provides a normative component that spurs
people to make caring relationships more just. With some exceptions
(Engster 2006; Puig de la Bellacasa 2017), care philosophies tend to
be human-centered and underdeveloped regarding responsibilities
to nonhuman relatives, speciﬁc localities, and ecosystems. Consideration of Indigenous philosophies helps to broaden understandings of
justice and care (Whyte and Cuomo 2017); they cultivate greater
concern for nonhuman relatives, respect for place, religio-spiritual
framings of creation, and a positive peace that moves beyond the
mere absence of violence. They foreground giftedness and advocate
cultivating balance, harmony, and a lasting peace in all relations.
From this exploration, justice as preservative care for sustained peace
emerges.
This essay’s orientation is inﬂuenced by the philosophy of Gilles
Deleuze, a thinker who has shaped assemblage theory, cinema studies,
moral philosophy, and more (Bogue 2003; Buchanan 2021; Jun
and Smith 2011; Rajchman 2000). Deleuze emphasizes the creation
of concepts in philosophy, an afﬁrmative process that generates
new concepts, connects concepts in novel ways, and gives voice
to new problems or reframes old ones (Conway 2010; Deleuze and
Guattari 1994). Concerning criteria for new philosophical texts,
Deleuze wrote the following words in a 1986 letter to Arnaud Villani:
I believe that a worthwhile book can be represented in three quick ways.
A worthy book is written only if (1) you think that the books on the
same or a related subject fall into a sort of general error (polemical function of a book); (2) you think that something essential about the subject
has been forgotten (inventive function); (3) you consider that you are
capable of creating a new concept (creative function). Of course, that’s
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the quantitative minimum: an error, an oversight, a concept…. Henceforth, for each of my books, abandoning necessary modesty, I will ask
myself (1) which error it claims to correct, (2) which oversight it wants
to repair, and (3) what new concept it has created (Dosse 2010, 112).

The error I seek to correct is an overemphasis on merit in the “long
tradition” of justice, an error that continues to shape contemporary
societies and political structures (such as those found in the United
States) leading to the “tyranny of merit” and its harmful consequences
(Sandel 2020). An oversight in Western philosophy, and in most
writings on care ethics, relates to the natural world and our nonhuman relatives; in this essay, I want to reorient justice and care by
connecting them more to the natural world and nonhuman beings.
The new concept I put forward is one that unites some of the best
elements in Western philosophy from Plato and Cicero, care ethics,
and Indigenous philosophy. In the end, I hope this essay will help us
to rethink relationships and the socio-political contexts we inhabit,
so we can live better lives and make the world a better place for all
sentient beings and for future generations.

A Commonplace Understanding of Justice
Some believe egalitarian conceptions of justice conceal the traditionally accepted concept of justice, which is discernible in the work of
Simonides (c. 548-468 B.C.E.). In Republic Book I, Polemarchus
clariﬁes Simonides’s view of what is just: “[Simonides] stated that it
is just to give to each what is owed to him. And it’s a ﬁne saying, in
my view” (1992, 331e). In The Four Cardinal Virtues, Josef Pieper
foregrounds this “long tradition” of justice as what one deserves:
Nevertheless there is a notion of the utmost simplicity to which that
bewildering variety [of conceptions of justice] can be reduced. Indeed,
Plato already mentions it as if it were handed down by long tradition.
It is the notion that each man is to be given what is his due (1965,
43-44).

From this, a clear understanding of injustice emerges for Pieper:
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All just order in the world is based on this: that man give man what is
his due. On the other hand, everything unjust implies that what belongs
to a man is withheld or taken away from him—and, once more, not by
misfortune, failure of crops, ﬁre or earthquake, but by man (1965, 44).

Justice concerns the ways humans interact and how societies ought
to treat people; the concern is with what each person should or
should not receive based on who they are, what they have done, and
the consequences of their actions. Emphasis is on merit, and this
generates the idea of justice as desert.
Philosophers have challenged this understanding; John Rawls
emphasizes luck’s role in people’s talents and genetic inheritances:
what people think they deserve is often based on a “natural lottery”
that does not originate in merit (1971, 64-65). John Kekes, however,
criticizes views that attempt to isolate justice from desert. He asks
readers to contemplate two societies; the ﬁrst distributes beneﬁts and
burdens randomly, and the second distributes beneﬁts and burdens
according to people’s actions and the characters that produce those
actions: good people get beneﬁts, bad people get burdens (2006,
88-89). Unlike the random society, the ordered society enables people to have reasonable expectations about outcomes based on their
characters, choices, and actions. Kekes has asked people, “Which
pattern would you impose?” He claims, “I have yet to meet one who
would not impose the ordered pattern” (2006, 88). The ordered society allows people to get what they deserve; people can predict that if
they perform speciﬁc good actions, they can expect certain good outcomes. In a random society, however, people would know that “hard
work, intelligent choice, and self-discipline, for instance, have exactly
the same chance of success as sloth, stupidity, and self-indulgence”
(2006, 89). The ordered society allows people to meet their needs, to
cultivate the life they want to live, and to have reasonable expectations about beneﬁts. People prefer the ordered society because they
will get what they deserve.
Kekes emphasizes an important point; he claims “justice is essentially inegalitarian” (2006, 106). Alluding to Aristotle, Kekes claims
justice as desert is compatible with treating “equals equally and
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unequals unequally” (2006, 106); people interact with others in dissimilar ways, they meet or fail to meet their obligations differently,
and what they have done (along with the associated consequences)
will warrant disparate advantages or disadvantages. People acting in
beneﬁcial ways should be treated equally and receive similar beneﬁts;
people acting in deleterious ways should be treated equally and
receive similar harms. The two classes ought to be treated unequally.
This is why egalitarian views of justice are misguided: egalitarians
overlook the centrality of characters, actions, consequences, and the
cultivation of merit based on how well people have lived in society;
according to Kekes, egalitarianism may be argued for based on other
concepts or values, but it is not grounded in justice. In the end, justice as desert is hierarchical, it reinforces inequalities concerning who
receives beneﬁts and burdens, and it exploits a prima facie consensus
for order over randomness by focusing principally on the link between
character, actions and their consequences, and related earned beneﬁts
or harms.
Some doubts exist, however. First, merit and desert are based on
a society’s values and norms; descriptively, certain characters and
actions may be valued, but that does not mean they ought to be valued. What is thought to be just in one society may later be seen to
be unjust by future generations; simply because a society is wellordered and facilitates people getting what they are due does not
mean that justice exists. Oppressed people have often lived in wellordered societies and have gotten exactly what they deserved according to established standards, so desert alone is insufﬁcient. Second,
justice as desert fails to address whether the conferred beneﬁts and
burdens improve individuals, their communities, and the common
good; justice as desert is partly decontextualized and offers little to no
guidance concerning whether what people deserve will actually work
toward the good of the recipient or those in a relationship with the
recipient. Winners of lotteries, for example, have deserved their winnings, but the ﬁnancial windfall in some cases has led to worse lives
through deleterious extravagance. Third, by simply focusing on merit
and individuals, it is unclear whether justice as desert will move
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beyond negative peace (as the mere absence of violence) to cultivate
a positive peace in society. Plato and Cicero were aware of similar
deﬁciencies.

Revising Justice: Plato and Cicero
In Book I of Plato’s Republic, Polemarchus amends the idea of justice:
“friends owe it to their friends to do good for them, never harm”,
and “in my view what enemies owe to each other is appropriately and
precisely—something bad” (1992, 332a-b). Socrates is uncomfortable
with this; justice is a “human virtue” (335b), and a human virtue
makes people better or excellent. For this reason, Socrates resists
injury-causing descriptions of justice as desert because they support
harming people. Instead of improving people, giving others what they
are due by harming them will lead those who are injured to be worse
off (335a-e). Socrates claims,
If anyone tells us, then, that it is just to give to each what he’s owed and
understands by this that a just man should harm his enemies and beneﬁt
his friends, he isn’t wise to say it, since what he says isn’t true, for it has
become clear to us that it is never just to harm anyone (Plato 1992,
335e).

What has been identiﬁed by Pieper, Kekes, and others as the “long
tradition” of justice is misguided: justice as desert supports harming
others.
Cicero foregrounds the beneﬁcial nature of justice in On Duties;
his Latin title (De officiis) was meant to allude to the Greek Stoic
emphasis on cultivating “appropriate behaviour directed towards virtue” (Walsh 2000, xvii). Justice is one of the four virtues that make
a person a moral human being; the other attributes are wisdom, courage or a lofty spirit, and temperance or moderation. From these four
attributes, human obligations or duties emerge. Cicero indicates justice is primarily concerned with social obligations:
Of justice, the ﬁrst ofﬁce is that no man should harm another unless he
has been provoked by injustice…. We are not born for ourselves alone,
to use Plato’s splendid words, but our country claims for itself one part of
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our birth, and our friends another. Moreover, as the Stoics believe, everything produced on the earth is created for the use of mankind, and men
are born for the sake of men, so that they may be able to assist one
another (1991, 9-10).

Cicero emphasizes the negative and positive aspects of justice: do no
harm (unless to protect oneself from harm), and support the welfare
of others and the common good. He connects the positive dimension
with beneﬁcence, generosity, or kindness. In being beneﬁcent, the
person must be sure to not harm the recipient or others in the process; such actions should not exceed one’s capabilities or resources,
and they must be appropriate to the recipient’s character. For Cicero,
beneﬁcence has its roots in love, fondness, and obligation to others,
and he writes that we ought to “enrich above all the person who is
most in need of riches” (1991, 21). Such assistance is embedded in
various spheres of human social relationships: our connection with
the entire human race, one’s country, and one’s family and friends.
Cicero’s cosmopolitan outlook shapes his view of justice with beneﬁcence, an outlook emphasizing respect for humanity and the belief
that human beings should be treated as ends in themselves, never
merely as a means (Nussbaum 2019, 27).
The juxtaposition of justice as desert with Plato’s and Cicero’s
amendments is relevant to Reinhold Niebuhr’s insight:
The most perfect justice cannot be established if the moral imagination
of the individual does not seek to comprehend the needs and interests of
his fellows… Any justice which is only justice soon degenerates into
something less than justice. It must be saved by something which is more
than justice (1960, 257-258).

Justice as desert is too thin because the effects on individuals and the
common good remain unaddressed; it overlooks how desert may
diverge from improving the recipient of a beneﬁt or how a burden
may cause unneeded suffering. Socrates raises this issue: suppose
a friend has lent you a weapon, and that friend comes back for it, but
is furiously insane; Socrates makes it clear that to give back the
weapon would be unjust, even though the friend deserves it (Plato
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1992, 331c-d). Justice as desert must be supplemented with a concern
for the person’s well-being, which should limit the criterion of desert.
Cicero embraces the good of the individual person and argues that
justice should support the common good and bind people together as
a society and as one large human community. The implications of
Plato’s and Cicero’s views are signiﬁcant; they challenge the enduring
belief that impartiality should guide the distribution of desert. Justice
cannot be impartial because concern with bettering individuals, the
common good, and humanity as a whole cannot be realized through
abstract, disinterested, and delocalized ways of distributing beneﬁts
and burdens. Concern for individuals embedded in context-dependent
relational networks should be included as an essential part of the concept of justice, and such concerns move us closer to a positive peace.

Justice and the Ethics of Care
Ethic-of-care history is grounded in feminist oppositions to abstractions, universality, impartiality, delocalized justice, and principlebased moral philosophy, which have been nurtured historically by
a “male” voice that excludes, underrepresents, or misrepresents
women (Collins 2015; Nye 1990; Rachels 2012, 147-58; SanderStaudt; Shafer-Landau 2018, 276-90). For example, Lawrence
Kohlberg posited a six-stage ethical framework of development, and
women supposedly occupy a lower level of development because they
concentrate more on social roles, relationships, and interpersonal
expectations. The highest stage, however, is associated with abstract
reasoning, universal ethical principles, rights, justice, and a Kantianinﬂuenced orientation. As Carol Gilligan observes,
Prominent among those who thus appear to be deﬁcient in moral development when measured by Kohlberg’s scale are women, whose judgments
seem to exemplify the third stage of his six-stage sequence. At this stage
morality is conceived in interpersonal terms and goodness is equated with
helping and pleasing others (1993, 18).

To move beyond this level, women would have to enter the realm of
traditional male activity:
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Kohlberg and Kramer imply that only if women enter the traditional
arena of male activity will they recognize the inadequacy of this moral
perspective and progress like men toward higher stages where relationships are subordinated to rules (stage four) and rules to universal principles of justice (stages ﬁve and six) (1993, 18).

Devaluing women is consistent with traditional Western philosophical biases: Aristotle believed men are superior to women by nature,
Aquinas evaluated women as defective, and Kant thought that laborious education weakened women’s charms (Shafer-Landau 2018, 276).
Resisting this, feminist care ethicists have argued not only for equality between men and women, but they have challenged traditional
moral philosophy by foregrounding care, partiality, and localized relationships; the role of parenting gained signiﬁcance as a way to think
ethically.
In the early stages of development, conﬂict existed between care
ethics and justice; in The Ethics of Care, Virginia Held asserts,
As thinking about [how] care developed, care and justice were often seen
as alternative native values. “Care” and “justice” were taken to name
different approaches to moral problems and characteristically different
recommendations concerning them. Care valued relationships between
persons and empathetic understanding; justice valued rational action in
accord with abstract principles (2006, 62).

Nel Noddings agrees: “The language of the mother concentrates on
relationships, needs, care, response, and connection rather than principles, justice, rights, and hierarchy” (2013, xiv). This shift supports
particular concerns about individuals and accepts emotions, caring,
and partiality in moral philosophy and ethical decision-making.
Noddings claims,
Caring preserves both the group and the individual and… it limits our
obligation so that it may realistically be met. It will not allow us to be
distracted by visions of universal love, perfect justice, or a world uniﬁed
under principle (2013, 100-101).

Early care ethicists and those who embraced justice as desert could
agree with one another: care and justice diverge.
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The ground between ethics, justice, and the personal caring realm
has shifted over the years. Susan Moller Okin supports including justice in the sphere of the family:
the family… must be just if we are to have a just society, since it is
within the family that we ﬁrst come to have that sense of ourselves and
our relations with others that is at the root of moral development
(1989, 14).

Annette C. Baier values sentiments, gentleness, and sympathy, but
she speciﬁcally values trust, which she argues is a fundamental component in human relationships; yet she also believes that justice and
care should not remain antagonistic, but must be harmonized (1995,
18-32, 95-202). Daniel Engster’s project is that “of developing care
ethics into a theory of justice”, and he claims that “the principles of
care theory are central to any adequate theory of justice” (2007, 5);
Engster argues that through care theory, justice can be improved making sure all people get the care and support they need (2007, 7).
Finally, Held embraces this stronger association between justice and
care; she indicates care ethics is in its infancy compared to justice’s
long history in Western thought, and she advocates that “the ethics
of care can and should include the concerns of justice, the general
welfare, and the virtues” (2015, 34). Ethic-of-care approaches have
become more inclusive: justice and care do not have a predetermined,
enduring hostile relationship; they can work together.
Joan Tronto supports this view: “We need to demand that caring
responsibilities be reallocated in a way that is consistent with our
other values, such as equality, justice, and freedom” (2015, 38).
Tronto reimagines democratic societies; they ought to be based on
care and should care more about caring practices. She deﬁnes care in
the following way:
in the most general sense, care is a species activity that includes everything we do to maintain, continue, and repair our world so that we may
live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves,
and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex,
life-sustaining web (as quoted in 2015, 3).
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Care includes ﬁve dimensions: (1) being more attentive, (2) being
more responsible for others, (3) being more competent in caring,
(4) being more responsive to those cared for, and (5) being a citizen
who cares with other citizens (2015, 5-16). People have needs, which
are supported through the work of others. Others care for us, and we
care for others; this occurs on a spectrum from receiving to giving
care. To care, however, is to be more discerning and attentive of
those in need (caring about); it is to identify who is responsible for
another’s care (caring for); it is to identify who should competently
give care to another (care giving); and it is about being responsive to
those we have cared for, listening and responding to their feedback
(care receiving). Caring is a two-way relational process supportive of
communication between care giver and care receiver, and some who
give care today will receive care tomorrow. A level of reciprocity is
often present as we give back to those who have cared for us, or we
care for others based on the care we previously received. Tronto
weaves this into the democratic political structure: we want a democracy that is attentive, responsible, competent, and responsive to its
citizens and helps them to live in the world as well as possible, while
supporting them in caring for each other. A just democratic political
system will cultivate a more caring society.
Eva Feder Kittay agrees based on her philosophical expertise and
her experience as a mother with a daughter who has a severe intellectual disability; U.S. society needs to provide more support for caregivers, care-receivers, and families with loved ones in need (2001,
566). While society can support the ﬂourishing of some with disabilities, Kittay argues other disabilities resist well-intentioned reforms:
Someone such as my daughter could not survive, much less thrive, without constant and vigilant attention, without someone performing for
her nearly all the tasks of daily living, as well as providing for her—
and her caregiver—the material resources required for her existence and
ﬂourishing (2001, 566).

Her daughter is a person, however, no matter how different she may
seem when viewed through a liberal conception of personhood. In
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different ways, Aristotle, Locke, and Rawls have focused on rationality, reasonableness, and being a productive member of society; her
daughter, Sesha, will never meet the criteria established by their marginalizing standards. Through compassionate, attentive interactions
with Sesha, Kittay is clear that her daughter is an active member in
forming her own world:
The shaping of one’s world is a gift that each individual possesses and
that some make more use of than others. Sesha, in spite of all her limitations, makes ample use of this gift. To be with Sesha is to enter her orbit,
to gain a glimpse of the world as she constructs it. Even those who are
still more limited than Sesha have this capacity. It requires an openness
to experience it (2001, 568).

All humans exist in relationships with various levels of dependence
and independence; through more receptive, attentive interactions
caregivers and care-receivers can learn from one another. Kittay
reminds readers how the boundaries of justice should expand to value
various levels of dependency and the importance of care:
Justice that is caring begins with an acknowledgment of our dependency
and seeks to organize society so that our well-being is not inversely
related to our need for care or to care; such justice makes caring itself
a mode of just action (2001, 576).

In harmony with Kittay, Barbara J. Lowe offers a relationally-based
moral philosophy that weaves together justice and care; she avoids
including care as a supplement. Care is a component of justice: we
cannot have “a comprehensive notion of justice” without special
attention to the role of care (2007, 96-97). The concept of justice
includes care, and contextualized ways of bringing justice into the
world should emphasize ways of caring and relating. Unlike Rawls,
Lowe embeds justice in a relational ontology: human beings enter the
world within a network of relationships, and they live their lives
within networks of relationships. Lowe, however, divides the concept
of justice in two; there is an abstract realm that respects basic human
needs and rights, and it is oriented around nonmaleﬁcence. The particularized realm, however, takes shape within the space of speciﬁc
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relationships that, ideally, cultivate beneﬁcence and ﬂourishing lives;
this honors localized relationships, roles, and obligations that constitute unique human lives. Both realms are grounded in, and seek to
cultivate, a deep respect for persons, but to focus solely on abstract
justice would lead to shallow relationships.
Lowe makes it clear that the vibrancy of life emerges from relationships that allow people to enter reciprocally into each other’s
lived reality, to come to understand the other person intimately for
who they are, and to mutually make each other’s life better and more
fulﬁlling; this receptive relationship is based on loving perception and
actions. This is juxtaposed with arrogant and sterile perceptions
and actions; the ﬁrst is based on conquering others, non-mutuality,
and an instrumental use of others. The second involves detachment
from others, a rigid way of interacting, and a lack of emotional connection. These approaches are non-receptive. Because the world
involves non-receptive interactions, which means particularized justice is not realized, a second receptive mode of perceiving and interacting is necessary. The sympathetic approach is cautious in nature
with all new relationships and with those who perceive and relate in
an arrogant or sterile way, but it is always ready to move to the intimate, reciprocal mode of loving perception and actions when trust
and reciprocity emerge. Lowe’s relationally-based moral philosophy
brings justice and care together as one: justice ought to be grounded
in care, and care ought to lead to justice at the abstract and particular
levels. With supportive social conditions in place, it is through loving
perception and interactions that justice can be realized most fully in
the world; through loving relationships, people ideally become their
best self and promote more just relationships, communities, and
international associations.

Justice and Indigenous Philosophies
Doing philosophy in North America means being mindful of the
colonizing past and present and the conﬂuences of intellectual inﬂuences (Pratt 2002); minimally, this should involve considering what
non-Western wisdom can contribute to conversations about justice
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and being committed to using that wisdom to improve society. Indigenous nations and peoples embrace and embody different sets of attitudes, beliefs, and values; the resulting philosophical orientations and
insights that emerge are distinct from those in the Western lineage
(Whyte and Cuomo 2017). Pieper believes that justice concerns how
humans treat one another; Kekes follows this line of thought when
discussing ordered societies and how they meet human needs. Similarly, Plato and Cicero think of justice as aiding only fellow human
beings. The consistent concern in ethics of care is how human beings
care for one another; while Tronto’s deﬁnition of care includes the
environment as part of the sphere of human caring activities, care
ethics tends to include the environment in a supplemental way. In
fact, most writings on care ethics are delocalized; they may be focused
on the United States or Western societies, but the absence of caring
for a speciﬁc geographical place is obvious; place-based concerns are
largely absent. With some exceptions (Engster 2006; Puig de la Bellacasa 2017), dominant emphases on nonhuman relatives is lacking,
as is the spiritual dimension and how it can shape reﬂections on care.
Nussbaum argues that justice needs to be more inclusive; it should be
more attentive to people with mental and physical impairments,
should focus on international relations and inequities between
wealthy and poor nations, and should broaden its concern for nonhuman species (2007, 1-8). Indigenous wisdom can expand our understanding of justice.
Creation is important. From the Haudenosaunee in North America to the Maori in New Zealand, a common belief is that creation is
not owned, but has been given to all beings for their use, so all beings
can ﬂourish; there is a sense of belonging to Earth and place (Mohawk
2010, 242; Whitt et al. 2001, 4-12). The Maori make this clear;
instead of thinking about owning Earth and its resources, they speak
of being owned by Earth: “One did not own land. One belonged to
the land” (as quoted in Whitt et al. 2001, 7). The Haudenosaunee
have a similar orientation:
The world does not belong to humans—it is the rightful property of the
Great Creator. The gifts and beneﬁts of the world, therefore, belong to
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all equally. The things that humans need for survival—food, clothing,
shelter, protection—are things to which all are entitled because they are
gifts of the creator. Nothing belongs to humans, not even their labor or
their skills, for ambition and ability are also the gifts of the Great Creator…. all people have a right to the things they need for survival, even
those who do not or cannot work, and no person or people has a right to
deprive others of the fruits of those gifts (Mohawk 2010, 242).

This orientation opposes a common view extending from John Locke
and Karl Marx to today’s capitalist-socialist debates, namely, the idea
that we own ourselves and our labor; instead, everything is a gift from
the creator, even our bodies and the labor we engage in.
As gifts, they are not our property but part of a larger network of
relations, embedded in the same understanding that creation exists
for the betterment of all beings, human and nonhuman alike. Indigenous philosophies resist uses of justice to buttress merit and ownership of property as one’s desert; such deployments of justice may allow
some to ﬂourish at the expense of others. We have been given the
gift of life within fragile networks of relationships that sustain life,
communities, and well-being; we did nothing to deserve this, and
part of being a good human being is to be grateful for the gifts we
have and to remember that we belong to creation and place, not the
other way around. Within our roles on Earth, we are urged to be
mindful of how we live, so we can coexist in ways that allow all
aspects of creation to ﬂourish, while not taking part in exploitative,
zero-sum interactions; Glen Sean Coulthard highlights this
reciprocity:
Within this system of relations human beings are not the only constituent believed to embody spirit or agency. Ethically, this meant that
humans held certain obligations to the land, animals, plants, and lakes
in much the same way that we hold obligations to other people. And if
these obligations were met, then the land, animals, plants, and lakes
would reciprocate and meet their obligations to humans, thus ensuring
the survival and well-being of all over time (2014, 61).

Along similar lines concerning “mutual relatedness” and “mutual
responsibility”, Winona LaDuke makes an important observation:
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what people normally call religion or spirituality is identiﬁed by
her and the Anishinaabeg peoples as “a way of life”, which means
attempting “to live a good life in the best way we can” (LaDuke and
Smith 2006, 40-43). Unlike some common ideas about religion or
spirituality that focus on the individual or institutional nature of worship, ritual, or honoring a transcendent creator, LaDuke asserts that
spirituality grounds her political activities; it regenerates her and prepares her to engage in long-term struggles for change. This struggle
comes at the intersection between the past, present, and future;
her work is grounded in remembrance of the Creator who placed her
people in a speciﬁc woodland territory, and it is mindful of her relatives who have helped her people to ﬂourish for thousands of years,
both two-legged and four-legged relatives. This remembrance is never
separated from the Creator who has given her people the gifts needed
for ceremony and physical sustenance, which is indicated in the
name for the Creator, Gichee Manitou (from the Ojibway/Anishinabe
language); this term means “a gift from the creator”, and these gifts
are intended to support not only the body but the mind and spirit as
well (LaDuke and Smith 2006, 44). This giftedness extends to nonhuman relatives, plant life, and water systems; by observing these
various dimensions of creation, Anishinaabeg peoples learn how to
be more human. Being more human is dependent on knowing our
relationships with nonhuman beings and what they can teach us
about life, reciprocity, and balanced living.
As part of the sturgeon clan, LaDuke reﬂects on the relatedness of
life and learning from nonhuman relatives, such as the sturgeon:
They are amazing ﬁsh who teach you about your humbleness in the big
picture of things. They can go so far, live so long, and have so many
descendants. They teach us through their existence. Over time our whole
clan system, our government system, is related to them. That way of
life… is related to our whole ecosystem and to our land (LaDuke and
Smith 2006, 46).

This mindfulness allows them to live according to the Creator’s law
(what they also call the natural law). For LaDuke and other Indigenous peoples, ceremonies celebrating the natural law, all human and
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non-human relatives, and creation are intimately connected to place
and manifestations of the sacred (hierophanies) that emerge only in
that place, bringing a medicine for the soul. Hierophanies make the
world habitable, orient Indigenous peoples, and become an axis mundi
(or center of the world); this location orients activities, ways of being,
and ways of relating, but it is largely about habitation, which means
it is better to speak of religion or spirituality from an Indigenous
perspective as being about habitation (Arnold 2012, 17-19). To
degrade the land, to decimate nonhuman populations, and to separate Indigenous peoples from their land and ecosystems is to threaten
or to undermine their connection to the Creator and to threaten
their identities and traditional ways of life; their identity, their personhood, and the relational web of life are inseparable from place.
Religion or spirituality as habitation (linked to hierophanies and
axis mundi) is often absent in discourses about justice and care, but
another overlooked topic is sustained peace; very little is said about
nurturing and sustaining positive peace when discussing desert or the
proper division of resources. Indigenous philosophies address this
oversight. For example, peace is an important value for the Haudenosaunee; the signiﬁcance of peace is grounded in the story of their
origins (Arnold 2008). Over 1,000 years ago in what is now New
York State, ﬁve Indigenous nations were locked in a cycle of violence;
Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca were spilling
blood over minor offences. A person called the Peacemaker crossed
what is now Lake Ontario, landing on its southern shore (Lyons
1991). This person slowly persuaded people to throw down and bury
their weapons of war, but one person resisted; Thadodá·ho’ was
twisted in physical form, had snakes in his hair, and was a frightening
person (Gonyea 2014, 9-10; Lyons 1991). In some versions of the
story, he consumed human ﬂesh. The Peacemaker and others united
with words and songs of peace, and they gently transformed
Thadodá·ho’ into a peaceful person. Interestingly, his name is now
the title for one of the highest positions within the Haudenosaunee
Confederacy; it reminds people of the violent past and how peaceful
means were used to cultivate a sustained peace, but this peace is more
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than the cessation of violence (negative peace). It is a long-term
positive peace that should be maintained throughout society and in
all relationships by each generation for seven generations into the
future (Lyons 2010, 42); this peace is focused on the ﬂourishing of all
beings, human and nonhuman alike, and it is concerned with protecting balance and harmony, so all creation can thrive. Furthermore,
this is not an abstract peace, but one localized through a deep connection with place and the unique attributes of the beings living in
that region. In other words, the cultivation and maintenance of peace
does not exist in an abstract realm, but is grounded in relationships
in a speciﬁc place with a unique history.
Vine Deloria, Jr. has been clear that one of the most important
dimensions of Indigenous thinking is a relational outlook: “We are
all relatives” (Deloria 1999, 33-34). Not only are humans related, but
they are related to nonhuman beings. Furthermore, these relationships exist only because of the place that supports them. In other
words, this is a shift in thinking that foregrounds the importance of
place and the relationships that emerge and are nurtured by that
place and the power of spirit manifested there: meaning, life, and
identity are grounded in geographical places with their spiritual energies. But the uniqueness of every being should be honored, and this
is clearest in Haudenosaunee stories about the origins of lacrosse and
the game played by nonhuman animals. The land animals and the
animals of the air had picked their teams. The land animals had
the agile, quick deer and the strong bear; the animals of the air
had the strong eagle and the vision of the owl (Calder and Fletcher
2011, 31). However, the bat was left over, and neither side wanted
him. Eventually, the animals of the air accepted the bat, and in the
end, the bat scored the winning goal for the animals of the air. The
lesson is clear: “This particular story teaches us that everyone is
important, everyone has a particular talent, and these talents can
make a difference in the ﬁnal outcome of events” (Calder and
Fletcher 2011, 31). When we graft this insight onto the story about
Thadodá·ho’, we understand that even the most violent people can
be transformed; people’s gifts can enhance the community; societies
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can transform themselves to be more inclusive and receptive to those
with unique gifts. In this way, the relational dimension is grounded
in the exchange of gifts: each person shares their own gifts and cares
for others to nurture their unique gifts; this reciprocity creates mutually enriching relationships allowing all to ﬂourish, both individuals
and communities. Inclusion, diversity, and the sharing of gifts beneﬁt
all (Arnold 2012, 1-2).
Indigenous philosophies provide a unique lens for reimagining justice. First, reﬂections on justice must be grounded in place; each
unique place with its unique ecosystems and nonhuman relatives cannot be thought of on an abstract, impartial level. Instead, justice
needs attunement to one’s local environs, all beings living in the
region, and how each contributes in a unique way to the ﬂourishing
of life through balance and harmony. Second, justice is not only
about human beings; from the Osage Nation to the Haudenosaunee,
nonhuman beings (from rocks and rivers to birds and trees) are part
of a larger familial network (Stokes et al. 1993; Tinker 2010). Humans
are one line of descent in a much larger family tree, so justice concerns the cultivation and maintenance of balance and harmony in all
relationships and between all beings. Third, based on Haudenosaunee
insights, justice must be thought of in terms of peace; this is not
a negative peace (the absence of violence) but a positive peace that
seeks to cultivate and sustain thriving relationships and lives for
seven generations to come (Lyons 2010). Justice through this lens
creates an extensive obligation network that urges people to think
about actions and relationships with a long-term emphasis that honors the many dimensions of creation; justice foregrounds the distant
future, interdependence, and an inclusive relational ontology that
embraces ecosystems, nonhuman relatives, and those human beings
who live there. Finally, justice cannot cause harm; those struggling
for justice should not be using violent, hate-ﬁlled, or derogatory
means. To bring justice is to use words, songs, actions, attitudes, and
values that are peaceful; peaceful means must be used for bringing
about an enduring justice that nurtures beneﬁcial relations with
all beings. This must be done in a spirit of humility and gratitude
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grounded in the realization that our personal existence is a gift from
the Creator, our ancestors, and the cultivation of life in our mother’s
womb and on Mother Earth—not based on merit but on giftedness.

Justice as an Ethic of Preservative Care for Sustained Peace
The long tradition of justice is grounded in desert; this is based on
merit generated through one’s character, actions, and the consequences of those actions, especially whether they beneﬁt or harm
society. Those who beneﬁt society according to the established traditions, values, and other evaluative criteria deserve beneﬁts; those who
harm society according to the established traditions, values, and
other evaluative criteria deserve harms, with little to no indication
that harms must lead to the improvement of offenders. This is problematic because justice, in this sense, normalizes harming others
without the idea of betterment. Justice is classiﬁed as a virtue, however, so if somebody is to be harmed, the harm must—in some way—
improve that person. Human improvement is a central concern of
justice, so justice as desert has to be tempered by how what people
deserve beneﬁts recipients and those around them. In other words,
well-being, improvement, and human excellence ought to be considered for all humans affected; harms can only be justiﬁed to the extent
that they cultivate human excellence for all people affected. Kekes,
Pieper, and others like Polemarchus who envision the concept of
justice in narrow terms are misguided. The ﬁrst component of the
broadening of the concept of justice and the development of
the conception of justice as preservative care for sustained peace is
this: Justice is concerned with human beneﬁt and the cultivation of
better human beings, so desert is not a sufﬁcient criterion.
Some revision is needed: People, whether we classify them as
“good” or “bad”, should get what they need to make themselves better. Returning to Thadodá·ho’, it is clear that his brutality would lead
many in the justice-as-desert camp to say that he deserved to be
harmed, but the story shows something different: what Thadodá·ho’
deserved (needed to become a better human being) was people
approaching him in a peaceful way to help him overcome his own
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wounded nature, so he could be in healthy, reciprocal relationships
with others. This points to something that not many who support
justice as desert are willing to accept: sometimes “good” people who
live well with others deserve less attention and resources because they
are already “good” people; in other words, often those people who are
seen as “bad” deserve more of a society’s peaceful attention and
resources to transform them for the better through consensus, unity,
and peaceful perseverance. It took time, energy, and love from the
ﬁve nations’ inhabitants to transform Thadodá·ho’, bringing him to
a position of peace and love. Instead of turning away from those who
have harmed others and injuring them as punishment (justice as retribution), the Haudenosaunee story reveals that sustained peaceful
attempts are needed to transform, heal, and reintegrate those who
have caused harm. While such sustained peaceful, caring interactions
and support will look different in different contexts, the goal is to
bring a lasting peace that honors people’s unique gifts and the wellbeing of the environment they live in; while there may be resistance,
that resistance will be met by all in a courageous, compassionate way
guided by an enduring commitment to sustained peace.
Behind this expanded view of justice is the relational dimension:
“We are all relatives” (Deloria 1999, 33-34); this interconnectedness
is present in ethic-of-care philosophies with the emphasis on a relational ontology sustaining life (Lowe 2007, 86). The traditional interpretation of justice conceals this relational ontology and undermines
the interdependent nature of human beings with one another and
with all creation. Justice should not concentrate on what individual
people deserve in isolation; doing so will separate them from their
relational context and conceal how the treatment of one impacts
others. While we may be angry and hurt because of a person’s actions,
to harm that person may bring about more serious injuries within the
relational web, cultivating greater imbalance and disharmony.
Nussbaum reminds readers of the dangers of pursuing justice through
anger; she examines movements for peace and justice, and leaders
such as Martin Luther King, Jr. have approached social change
through nonviolence and non-anger (2016, 211-246). For example,
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while in a Birmingham jail, King’s anger transitioned from focusing
on harms (and the possible desire for payback or status correction) to
the idea that something must be done to improve society for all members, so everybody could live in peace: “a substantive and positive
peace, in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human
personality” (2015, 410). Agreeing with Gandhi and King, Nussbaum
claims “that anger is not only not necessary for the pursuit of justice,
but also a large impediment to the generosity and empathy that help
to construct a future of justice” (2016, 8). Non-anger, caring relations, nonviolence, justice, and peace go together.
It is important, however, to think about how justice extends to
nonhuman relatives and all creation. Even if we accept the concept
of justice as a human virtue, human beings are intimately connected
with nonhuman relatives, and these extended relationships play an
important part in allowing us to exist: to destroy nonhuman relatives
brings harm to ecosystems, and the effects of that harm often impact
other ecosystems. Justice needs to be conscious of this. As a human
virtue, justice ought to bring betterment to all human beings in a way
that reinforces the delicate web of relations that sustain us. Justice
needs to expand and become more inclusive: this interpretation of
the human virtue now embraces, at least minimally in a consequentialist way, the reality that humans cannot exist and ﬂourish without
nonhuman relatives, so justice must protect and cultivate the wellbeing and ﬂourishing of our nonhuman relatives.
This emphasis on the relational dimension and the improvement
of human beings so they become their best self has serious implications for ethical and political thought: It is no longer acceptable to
remain at an abstract, universal, impartial level. Part of the process
of cultivating justice must be to turn to the concrete, particular, partial level and actually engage ﬂesh-and-blood human beings and our
nonhuman relatives and their needs and gifts. Following Tronto, this
means becoming more attentive to the needs of particular human
beings and their communities, becoming more responsible for the
well-being of others, and this means doing things in a competent way
to help others become better and being receptive and responsive to
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them through their feedback. It is unwise to believe that every being
can be beneﬁted in the same way; to help beings thrive and to move
them beyond suffering, discontentment, or a sense of not belonging
cannot be done on an abstract, universal, impartial level. Helping
others is a process grounded in direct contact: being present, receptive, listening carefully, and actually caring about their well-being
and betterment. Merging ethic-of-care and Indigenous philosophies
on this point, the idea of gifts returns: an important aim of caring is
to preserve the unique gifts in others to allow them to ﬂourish and to
help those gifts beneﬁt society in a reciprocal way. This is the preservative care component of justice: to better others and society, justice
urges us to care for others in a way that will mutually better the
recipient and society through preserving the unique gifts each person
has (Groves 2009).
This must be grounded in long-term thinking. In today’s world of
new markets and products, rapidly-changing technologies, and the
unconstrained generation of new information, short-term interests
and instant gratiﬁcation dominate. A lack of long-range thinking
exists; from failures to look decades into the future concerning the
environment to economic imprudence in a debt society, globally
many nations and their citizens fail to grasp the big picture as geographical interdependence and future generations are overlooked.
Indigenous philosophies help to undermine this myopia; temporal
re-orientation is given clear articulation through the words of Oren
Lyons: “In our way of life, in our government, with every decision we
make, we always keep in mind the seventh generation to come”
(quoted in Lyons 2010, 42). This provides a long-range focus; understanding a generation as 20 to 30 years in length, the Haudenosaunee
are urging people to think 140 to 210 years into the future for every
signiﬁcant decision. This is not simply a temporal declaration, however, for those making the decisions must consider the interconnected
nature of their decisions to make sure that the effects do not move
outward to impact others in a negative way. Each decision cannot be
contained in the place the decision was made. From an Indigenous
philosophical outlook, long-term thinking is necessarily complemented
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by a deep appreciation for lateral geographical and ecological effects
that respects interconnections and responsibilities arising because of
those connections. Caring justice is not a short-term, transactional,
one-time event but a long-term commitment to others that demonstrates that others are worthy of our time and trust (Groves 2009).
An example of this long-term, reciprocal thinking can be found in
Robin Wall Kimmerer’s Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom,
Scientific Knowledge, and the Teachings of Plants (2013). Kimmerer,
a biologist of Anishinaabe ancestry, unites science with Indigenous
wisdom in a way that helps readers to understand the close, mutuallybeneﬁcial relationships humans can have with nonhumans, especially
plant life. While explaining traditional ecological wisdom, known as
the Honorable Harvest, which cultivates respect for the gifts of creation and an attitude of self-restraint instead of greed and overconsumption, Kimmerer writes,
Collectively, the Indigenous canon of principles and practices that govern the exchange of life for life is known as the Honorable Harvest. They
are rules of sorts that govern our taking, shape our relationships with the
natural world, and rein in our tendency to consume—that the world
might be as rich for the seventh generation as it is for our own. The
details are highly speciﬁc to different cultures and ecosystems, but the
fundamental principles are nearly universal among peoples who live close
to the land (180).

The principles help to preserve the various species on the land and
their relationships with other species, and through the maintenance
of this balanced preservation, future generations will be able to thrive.
As previous generations preserved creation for today’s generations,
today’s generations have an obligation to protect creation for future
persons, human and nonhuman. Kimmerer lists some of the principles that guide daily actions and how people are to nourish themselves through agriculture, gathering, and hunting: “Take only what
you need”, “Never take more than half. Leave some for others”, “Harvest in a way that minimizes harm”, “Use it respectfully. Never waste
what you have taken”, “Share”, “Give thanks for what you have been
given”, and “Sustain the ones who sustain you and the earth will last
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forever” (183). When thinking about the seventh generation, then,
this wisdom orients people to cultivate a speciﬁc attitude toward life
and all creation, an attitude valuing respect, reciprocity, gratitude,
balance, harmony, self-restraint, and the fragile interdependent web
of creation that extends from the past through the present to the
future. To be guided by seventh-generation considerations is to
embody this attitude and to leave the world in a thriving condition,
which will allow others in the future to thrive because of our selfrestraint and reverence for all of our relationships.
All of this generates an apparent paradox, however: ethical particularity leading to greater ethical universalism. Care ethics and
Indigenous philosophies focus on the speciﬁc, whether particular
people to whom we offer preferential support or speciﬁc geographical
places and their surrounding ecosystems. However, each locus of concern, care, and direct support is connected to another person, another
place, or another link in the chain of successive generations. A caringjust approach becomes a way of sustaining peace through long-range
decisions that are grounded in the realization that all places and
beings are interconnected with other beings and other locales (no
matter how tenuously), so the peace that is being advocated is one
in which the spatio-temporal dimensions of preserving the gifts of all
human and nonhuman beings takes on new signiﬁcance: Not only
should justice be sustained across generations, but also in everexpanding circles to other regions and ecosystems. Justice needs
to move beyond individuals and their communities and nations to
become more inclusive by focusing on the relational networks sustaining every living being. In other words, justice must become more
inclusive, must be more attentive to all human and nonhuman
beings, their interdependence, and how present decisions and actions
may drastically beneﬁt or harm future beings. Unlike Kohlberg’s
abstract universalism, this approach is one of expanding ripples of
care leading from caring-for obligations (“encounters characterized by
direct attention and response”) to caring-about postures toward the
world and future generations (which includes “concern but does not
guarantee a response to one who needs care”) (Noddings 2013, xiv).
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Because of limits placed on us by time, space, and other resources, we
can only offer so much direct caring for others (Noddings 2013, xiv);
however, this does not mean that we cannot care about, and dedicate
some of our attention to, the welfare of others around the world or
in future generations. In our caring for some human and nonhuman
animals or place-based ecosystems, we can do so with a caring, compassionate eye for those outside our direct sphere of inﬂuence.
A caring attitude and a commitment to justice as preservative care
for sustained peace can guide all we do and all of our interactions.

Recapitulation
Two texts in the Western philosophical tradition, Plato’s Republic
and John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, bracket approximately 2,400
years of philosophy. During that time, justice has maintained a level
of signiﬁcance and gained intellectual texture: in writings from Plato
and Aristotle to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to Thomas Hobbes
and David Hume, justice has resurfaced. While early feminist theorists distrusted justice, whether they rejected it because of its paternalistic associations or wanted to downgrade its signiﬁcance, considerations of justice have been unavoidable. As care ethics developed,
scholars such as Engster and Tronto have emphasized the need to
weave care and justice together; Lowe has endorsed a shift that harkens back to Plato and Cicero: justice, benevolence, and care are not
separate. To have justice, whether at an abstract or particular level,
is to have care; in other words, justice does not exist without care.
Whereas justice as desert tends to be abstract and focus on individuals, ethic-of-care philosophies have helped to reorient justice in
a better direction. Some limitations affect care ethicists’ outlooks on
justice; nonhuman beings tend to be absent, there is little to no focus
on religious or spiritual foundations for justice, and Indigenous inclusion is largely absent. For philosophers writing in territories with
a legacy of past and present acts of colonization, this is problematic.
This essay offers a correction: its aim is to act as a philosophical intervention (Bartky 1990, 4-5). The important dimensions of
Indigenous thought in this essay are the giftedness of creation and
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belonging to Earth, the fact that we truly own nothing, honoring
each being’s unique gifts, and the signiﬁcance of long-term peace
grounded in a relational worldview that seeks to preserve and nurture
balance and harmony.
In the end, the traditional concept of justice as desert is clearly
problematic; minimally, it is too narrow and needs to be broadened,
but what is worse is that in some contexts this understanding actually
supports injustice. This traditional concept did not come down to the
present without challenges; Plato and Cicero made it clear that
beneﬁcence, human improvement, and unique individual needs had
to be part of the consideration. Being mindful of this inclusion of
beneﬁcence broadens the concept of justice to include care for those
who are taking part in the relational cultivation of justice, and this
opens the space for the obvious inclusion of care ethics for considerations of justice. Justice and care unite.
Indigenous philosophies help to ﬂesh out what care can look like.
They offer a long-term approach for decision-making and how actions
will affect others; this does not focus solely on human beings but
expands to consider how our actions will harm or beneﬁt nonhuman
relatives, from rocks and trees to birds, bears, and Earth. This concern
is guided by the assumption that each being has special gifts (unique
attributes and skills or ways of being) that are crucial to thriving;
consideration of these gifts is important, and this transforms an ethic
of care into an ethic of preservative care: the focus is on how to preserve and sustain all the conditions that will allow the unique gifts of
all beings to grow and ﬂourish. Grounded in the Indigenous relational
outlook, the cultivation and preservation of these unique gifts reciprocally enhance the larger community; as the larger community
thrives, this in turn preserves and nurtures the unique gifts of those
who make up the community. This includes a long-range concern
that focuses on seven generations to come and a religious or spiritual
recognition of place that urges us to mindfully inhabit the land on
which we live.
Justice is no longer simply about the here and now, but it is
grounded in a long temporal chain; today’s beings exist because of the
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preservative care of beings in the past, and future beings will exist
because of long-range thinking today. In this way, justice as desert
and egalitarian distributive justice face a third alternative; justice as
preservative care for sustained peace provides a new way to think
about what justice can mean.

Coda
An initial possible concern may emerge relating to cultural appropriation. This focuses on how information, wisdom, and ideas from
an oppressed group or culture are used, whether they are used peacefully or in a violent, unjust way (Ruehl 2019). Minimally, instead of
contributing to direct behavioral violence, cultural violence, and
structural violence (Galtung 1990), the incorporation of Indigenous
information, wisdom, and ideas should contribute to sustained direct
behavioral peace, cultural peace, and structural peace. Scholars
should approach such inclusions as an ally to Indigenous nations and
peoples and attempt to generate dialogues across cultures to make the
world a better place for all sentient beings, their ecosystems, and
Mother Earth. To avoid cultural appropriation and further harms,
scholarly work should embody—to the best of its ability—the idea
of justice as preservative care for sustained peace. As I concluded
elsewhere:
It is important to structure research and publications in a way that
includes an ethic of preservative care, making sure that all research, publications, and teaching are not grounded in exclusionary, non-reciprocal
practices, but also grounded in inclusive practices intent on nurturing the
unique gifts of others for the mutual well-being of all those we encounter
and for the betterment of future generations (Ruehl 2019).

A secondary concern may emerge relating to the peaceful approach
supported throughout this essay, which has guided my response to the
concern about cultural appropriation: violence in the world will not
end with completely nonviolent means and aims; those who are violent and unjust will use violent and unjust means to maintain power,
wealth, and privilege. However, one simply has to look to the great
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leaders who have cultivated courageous nonviolent, non-angry, and
caring responses to injustice and violence. The Haudenosaunee,
Gandhi, King, and Mandela offer counterexamples that show how
nonviolent, non-angry, or caring responses are quite powerful, unifying, effective, and supportive of long-term positive peace. We need
more of these examples—and many more supporters—to make sustained peace a reality.
The above issues are important, but the limits of space do not
allow for a full philosophical exposition; however, this much can be
said: engagement with and use of another culture’s ideas can be done
with preservative care with long-term peace in mind, and if this is
not done, scholars should respectfully hold each other accountable
for violations. The struggle to change the world for the better through
peace, nonviolence, non-anger, and care take courage; this just may
be one reason why so few are able to be as brave as those who have
embodied these character traits as they have struggled against domination and oppression around the world. We need more of this courage in our personal lives, but we also need it in our academic, professional, and civic lives. May we encourage one another to be better
and to work for justice as preservative care for sustained peace in all
we do.

Works Cited
Arnold, Philip P. 2012. The Gift of Sports: Indigenous Ceremonial Dimensions of the
Games We Love. San Diego: Cognella.
Arnold, Philip P. 2008. “Haudenosaunee Confederacy.” In The Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, ed. Bron R. Talor, 746-48. New York: Continuum.
Baier, Annette C. 1995. Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Bartky, Sandra Lee. 1990. Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of
Oppression. New York: Routledge.
Bogue, Ronald. 2003. Deleuze on Cinema. New York: Routledge.
Bubeck, Diemut. 1995. Care, Gender, and Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Buchanan, Ian. 2021. Assemblage Theory and Method. New York: Bloomsbury
Academic.
Calder, Jim, and Ron Fletcher. 2011. Lacrosse: The Ancient Game. Brantford: Ancient
Game Press.
Cicero. 1991. On Duties. New York: Cambridge University Press.

376

ROBERT MICHAEL RUEHL

Collins, Stephanie. 2015. The Core of Care Ethics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Conway, Jay. 2010. Gilles Deleuze: Affirmation in Philosophy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coulthard, Glen Sean. 2014. Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of
Recognition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. 1994. What Is Philosophy? New York: Columbia
University Press.
Deloria, Vine, Jr. 1999. Spirit and Reason: The Vine Deloria, Jr. Reader. Wheat Ridge:
Fulcrum Publishing.
Dosse, Francois. 2010. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: Intersecting Lives. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Engster, Daniel. 2006. “Care Ethics and Animal Welfare.” Journal of Social Philosophy
37 (4): 521-536.
Engster, Daniel. 2007. The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Galtung, Johan. 1990. “Cultural Violence.” Journal of Peace Research 27 (3): 291-305.
Gilligan, Carol. 1993. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Gonyea, Wendy. 2014. “Who Are the Haudenosaunee?” In Neighbor to Neighbor,
Nation to Nation: Readings about the Relationship of the Onondaga Nation with Central New York, USA, ed. Neighbors of the Onondaga Nation, 9-12. Syracuse:
Neighbors of the Onondaga Nation.
Groves, Christopher. 2009. “Future Ethics: Risk, Care and Non-Reciprocal Responsibility.” Journal of Global Ethics 5 (1): 17-31.
Held, Virginia. 2006. The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Held, Virginia. 2015. “Care and Justice, Still.” In Care Ethics and Political Theory, ed.
Daniel Engster and Maurice Hamington, 19-36. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Jun, Nathan, and Daniel W. Smith. 2011. Deleuze and Ethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.
Kekes, John. 2006. “Justice: A Conservative View.” Social Philosophy and Policy 23
(2): 88-108.
Kimmerer, Robin Wall. 2013. Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom, Scientific
Knowledge, and the Teachings of Plants. Minneapolis: Milkweed Editions.
King, Martin Luther, Jr. 2015. “Letter from Birmingham City Jail.” In The Ethical
Life: Fundamental Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems, 3rd ed., ed. Russ ShaferLandau, 405-415. New York: Oxford University Press.
LaDuke, Winona, and Huston Smith. “Ecology and Spirituality: Following the Path
of Natural Law.” In A Seat at the Table: Huston Smith in Conversation with Native
Americans on Religious Freedom, ed. Phil Cousineau, 39-57. Berkeley: University
of California Press.

REIMAGINING JUSTICE AS PRESERVATIVE CARE

377

Lowe, Barbara J. 2007. “Receptive Perception, Particularized Justice, and Moral
Agency.” In Moral Perception, ed. Jeremy Wisnewski, 82-98. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Lyons, Oren. 1991. “Oren Lyons: The Faithkeeper.” Interviewed by Bill Moyers.
Moyers, July 3, 1991. Video, 57:05. Accessed October 15, 2021. https://billmoyers.com/content/oren-lyons-the-faithkeeper/.
Lyons, Oren. 2010. “Keepers of Life.” In Moral Ground: Ethical Action for a Planet in
Peril, ed. Kathleen Dean Moore and Michael P. Nelson, 42-44. San Antonio:
Trinity University Press.
Madison, James. 2003. “No. 51.” In The Federalist: With Letters of “Brutus,” ed. Terence Ball, 252-55. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mohawk, John. 2010. Thinking in Indian: A John Mohawk Reader, ed. José Barreiro.
Golden: Fulcrum.
Niebuhr, Reinhold. 1960. Moral Man and Immoral Society. Louisville: Charles
Scribner’s Sons.
Noddings, Nel. 2013. Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education,
2nd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2019. The Cosmopolitan Tradition: A Noble but Flawed Ideal.
Cambridge: Belknap Press.
Nussbaum, Martha. 2007. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge: Belknap Press.
Nye, Andrea. 1990. Words of Power: A Feminist Reading of the History of Logic. New
York: Routledge.
Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Basic Books.
Pieper, Josef. 1965. The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Plato. 1992. Republic. Translated by G. M. A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Pomerleau, Wayne P. n.d. “Western Theories of Justice.” Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Accessed October 30, 2020. https://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest/#SH1b.
Pratt, Scott L. 2002. Native Pragmatism: Rethinking the Roots of American Philosophy.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Puig de la Bellacasa, María. 2017. Matters of Care: Speculative Ethics in More than
Human Worlds. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Rachels, James. 2012. The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 8th ed. New York: McGrawHill Education.
Rajchman, John. 2000. The Deleuze Connections. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press.
Ruehl, Robert Michael. 2019. “Let’s Change the Subject: Grounding Social Change
in Indigenous History and Philosophy.” The Seneca Falls Dialogues Journal 3: 77-106.
Sandel, Michael J. 2020. The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the Common Good?
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

378

ROBERT MICHAEL RUEHL

Sander-Staudt, Maureen. n.d. “Care Ethics.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Accessed October 30, 2020. https://www.iep.utm.edu/care-eth/#H1.
Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2018. The Fundamentals of Ethics, 4th ed. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Stokes, John, David Benedict, Rokwaho, Jake Swamp, and Ka-Hon-Hes. 1993.
Thanksgiving Address: Greetings to the Natural World: Words Before All Else. Corrales: The Tracking Project.
Tinker, George. 2010. “An American Indian Cultural Universe.” In Moral Ground:
Ethical Action for a Planet in Peril, ed. Kathleen Dean Moore and Michael
P. Nelson, 196-201. San Antonio: Trinity University Press.
Tronto, Joan. 2013. Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice. New York: New
York University Press.
Tronto, Joan. 2015. Who Cares? How to Reshape a Democratic Politics. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Walsh, P. G. 2000. “Introduction.” In On Obligations, ed. P. G. Walsh, ix-xlvii. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Whitt, Laurie Anne, Mere Roberts, Waerete Norman, and Vicki Grieves. 2001.
“Indigenous Perspectives.” In A Companion to Environmental Philosophy, ed. Dale
Jamieson, 3-20. New York: Blackwell Publishing.
Whyte, Kyle Powys, and Chris J. Cuomo. 2017. “Ethics of Caring in Environmental
Ethics: Indigenous and Feminist Philosophies.” In The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics, ed. Stephen M. Gardiner and Allen Thompson, 234-247. New
York: Oxford University Press.

